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Abstract
Judicial readings of the right to health—and related rights—frequently possess something of an “all or 
nothing” quality, exhibiting either straightforward deference to allocative choices or conceptualizing 
the right as absolute, with consequent disruption to health systems, as witnessed in Latin America. 
This article seeks to identify pathways through which a normatively intermediate approach might be 
developed that would accord weight to rights claims without overlooking the scarcity of health resources. 
It is argued that such development is most likely both to accompany and support a role for courts as 
institutions functioning within a society that is characterized by a deliberative conception of democracy.  
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Introduction: Why worry about 
judicialization?
As the debate on the recognition and enforcement 
of socio-economic rights, both within international 
law and as components of domestic constitutional 
frameworks, has shifted ground from the question 
of their justiciability to that of their scope and 
content, the likelihood of such rights becoming the 
subject of judicial determination has increased. In 
the case of the right to health (or cognate formula-
tions, such as the right to have access to health care 
services), “judicialization” is a widely recognized 
occurrence with particular resonance for certain 
regions, such as Latin America, as is clearly attested 
by the contributions to this journal special section. 
While frequently problematized, judicializa-
tion is a more nuanced phenomenon than accounts 
often suggest. In addition to serving a practical 
purpose as a mechanism for securing access to med-
icines and services which may have been denied or 
restricted by health care providers in violation of 
principles of equity or considerations of clinical or 
cost-effectiveness, adjudication in the courtroom 
may also fulfill a deeper democratic function. First, 
it can act as a forum for accountability, offering an 
opportunity for government to explain, and the 
public to understand, the steps taken (or not tak-
en) in respect of realization of the right to health, 
thereby contributing to its progressive realization. 
In short, “it is a process that helps to identify what 
works, so it can be repeated, and what does not, 
so it can be revised.”1 Even more broadly (and as 
noted hereafter), it can operate as a catalyst for pub-
lic debate upon the need for limit-setting choices; 
upon the criteria upon which such choices might be 
based; and upon the particular choice itself. In this 
manner, courts can assist in “unblocking” political 
or managerial processes which might otherwise 
be unresponsive to legitimate demands for access 
to health care resources.2 Hence, while the precise 
nature and impact of judicial intervention will, of 
course, vary according to the politico-legal context, 
it is certainly plausible, as noted by Brinks and 
Gauri, that “courts’ decisions do not so much stop 
or hijack the policy debate as inject the language of 
rights into it and add another forum for debate.”3
Nonetheless, it remains the case that judicial 
decisions can also have a significant disruptive 
impact upon the pattern of services and treatments 
that are made available within health systems. Two 
examples from Latin America are illustrative of this 
possibility. Research into legal actions to obtain 
access to medicines in São Paulo, Brazil, found that 
a tendency to comply mechanically with judicial 
rulings meant that 
there is no assessment of whether it is the best 
treatment in terms of the cost/benefit ratio, whether 
the patient truly needs the medication requested, 
whether it can be replaced by another treatment 
provided by the [public national] pharmaceutical 
programs, or even whether provision of this 
medication breaks a fundamental law or principle 
of the health care system.4 
Similarly, an analysis of cases brought in the 
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in 
Costa Rica showed that around 70% resulted in 
access being granted to low-priority or experimen-
tal medicines that “can be described as providing 
“marginal” health benefits for very severe condi-
tions at a high cost for the health care system.”5
On the basis of such studies, one might 
plausibly evaluate right to health litigation as an 
activity that falls well short of a rationalist ideal of 
policy-making, which centers upon the pursuit of 
optimal solutions—understood to be those which 
can objectively be demonstrated to maximize ben-
efits and minimize costs—developed on the basis 
of comprehensive information about alternative 
courses of action.6 Unfavorable comparisons are 
drawn with health technology assessment (HTA) 
as an evidence-based approach to problems of the 
allocation of scarce resources for health, founded 
upon instrumentally rationalist values of certainty, 
objectivity, method, and calculability.7 Thus, the 
Pan-American Sanitary Conference has criticized 
regular use of the courts in Latin America for its 
propensity “to ensure access to health technologies, 
often without having verified their effectiveness, 
[but which] can distort the process of incorporating 
new technologies,” in contradistinction to HTA as 
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a transparent and rational means of safeguarding 
a right to health anchored in principles of equity, 
equality, and solidarity.8       
The gradual evolution of HTA institutions 
across Latin America may, in due course, result in a 
reconfiguration of the socio-political environment 
in which decisions on allocation of scarce health 
care resources are made, as well as the criteria 
which underpin them. Even so, the constitutional-
ization of health rights across the region, coupled 
with the singular importance of such choices to 
individuals and their families, will render a con-
tinued role for courts inevitable; “the language of 
rights, the mechanism of courts, the intervention 
of lawyers, and the cumbersome tools of the law 
have become a permanent and prominent part of 
the policy-making landscape.”9 It is therefore im-
portant to maintain a reflective attitude towards 
health rights adjudication as an activity of ongoing 
political, social, and economic significance. 
Reflecting upon further avenues for future 
research and development in light of an analysis of 
health rights litigation (with a primary, but not exclu-
sive, focus on Latin America), Yamin has argued that 
clarifying the normative foundations and 
conceptions of health will be critical in order for 
courts to provide a framework for facilitating 
appropriate decision-making processes relating to 
constantly evolving claims of what we owe each 
other in regard to health and health care.10 
This article seeks to undertake some initial steps 
in this direction, through critical consideration of 
possible normative bases through which the right 
to health might be further developed. The intention 
is not to offer a complete investigation of the matter, 
but rather to initiate a discussion of some mech-
anisms by way of which the right to health might 
stand alongside, and perhaps even facilitate, the 
types of “informed, well-thought choices involving 
trade-offs of societal values” that are increasingly 
imperative given the significant and growing prob-
lems of health system sustainability that prevail 
not only in Latin America, but worldwide.11 As will 
be seen, several difficult issues remain unsettled, 
providing fruitful scope for further analysis of, and 
debate upon, this highly complex topic.  
Reading the right to health against scarcity
Much important recent work in this context has 
focused upon the impact of health rights litigation, 
but the normative foundation of the right to health, 
described in 2011 as having generated “remark-
ably little literature,” has also received increasing 
attention.12 Nonetheless, the tension between the 
existence of a presumptively conclusory right of ac-
cess and the finite nature of resources for health care 
remains acute: indeed, one highly eminent scholar 
in the field has described the need to set priorities 
for allocation as a “blind spot” of the health and 
human rights movement.13 Some authors have re-
sponded to this tension by expressing scepticism as 
to whether a right to health is feasible at all.14 Others 
have noted that the fact of scarcity renders rights-
based approaches of limited utility in addressing 
problems of health inequity in practice.15 However, 
given the inevitability that rights to health will con-
tinue to be the subject of adjudication, this stance 
does not seem especially helpful: even if there are 
sound philosophical arguments for not according 
health (or access to health care) status as rights, the 
fact remains that they are presently so recognized, 
and are likely to remain so.  
At the other end of the scale is a reading of the 
right to health that treats it as absolute, one which 
expresses demanding moral claims in a sort of 
‘line item’ way, presenting each individual’s case 
peremptorily, as though it brooked no denial, no 
balancing, no compromise.16 
From this perspective, the fact of scarcity is irrel-
evant; the right must be upheld irrespective of the 
impact upon resources and the broader common 
good. As Rumbold observes, few would adhere 
to this absolutist reading of the nature of rights 
(whether generally, or in the health context in 
particular).17 Nevertheless, rights carry very sig-
nificant weight, both as legal claims and as modes 
of political discourse, as captured in Dworkin’s 
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influential metaphor of rights as “trumps over 
some background justification that states a goal for 
the community as a whole.”18 Institutional factors 
further reinforce this approach: adjudication in the 
courtroom tends to focus judicial—and public—at-
tention upon the individual claimant, especially in 
systems (such as that of Brazil) where health rights 
claims are almost always made on an individual ba-
sis rather than as collective or class actions, and the 
court’s ruling applies only to the parties directly 
involved in the litigation.19 
Although rights to health contained within 
domestic constitutional or international human 
rights instruments at base embody legal and discur-
sive claims of a substantive character, it is possible 
for courts to afford some degree of protection to 
claimants through procedural means, such as oblig-
ing decision-makers to publish their decisions and 
the criteria upon which they are based, or facilitat-
ing participation in processes of decision-making. 
In these instances, it may be argued that the effect 
of adjudication is to enforce the conditions of the 
“accountability for reasonableness” model of pro-
cedural justice.20 In this manner, adjudication can 
contribute to facilitating “social learning” as to the 
need for limit-setting in health care and the criteria 
which might underpin decisions in this context. 
This is valuable as a means of securing legitima-
cy for difficult choices, even in the absence of an 
agreed ethical basis for achieving justice in the 
distribution of scarce resources. This dimension of 
judicialization has been explored at length in the 
literature and will not be developed further here.21 
When judges engage with the right to health 
from a substantive perspective, they might be said 
(with a degree of simplification) to take any of three 
positions on the scale outlined above. First, the 
mere fact of scarcity may straightforwardly defeat 
the rights claim outright, calling into question the 
feasibility of giving effect to the right in any cir-
cumstances. At the other end of the scale, the rights 
claim acts as a “trump”, with the consequence 
that such resources are allocated as are necessary 
to give effect to the claimant’s right, irrespective 
of the possible impact upon others who are not 
appearing before the court.  Both of these judicial 
stances might be regarded as problematic. The first 
seems to attach insufficient weight to the right as 
a claim in law and appears incompatible with the 
trend towards the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights. The second accords insufficient weight to the 
opportunity costs of giving effect to the right, and 
thus carries particular potential for disruption to 
the rational distribution of scarce resources within 
a health system.  
A middle ground? Proportionality and the 
right to health
However, between these two extremes exists a 
potential position in which judges may scrutinize 
the decision-maker’s rationale for failing to give 
effect to the right, with a view to ensuring that 
the justifications offered accord with broadly 
shared community values as to what is appropriate 
within the particular society in question. In such 
circumstances, the court seeks to establish that 
the decision-maker’s explanations correspond 
with “public reason”, which may be understood as 
reasonable judgments about what justice and good 
policy requires under the circumstances: that is, 
reasons which are publicly appropriate in a liberal 
democracy.22 If so, the court determines that the 
putative infringement of the right is justified, and 
thus not unlawful.       
Adoption of an approach along these lines 
requires that judges continue to afford protection 
to the individual’s right, which retains significant 
weight. This is so in two ways: first, once the claim-
ant has demonstrated that a right is engaged, the 
burden of explanation falls upon the decision-mak-
er to show that there are justifiable reasons for 
restricting the right. If such explanations are not 
forthcoming or do not convince the court, the 
decision will be deemed unlawful, at least until ad-
equate justification is provided. Secondly, the right 
is to be realized to the greatest extent possible given 
countervailing considerations; put differently, the 
interference with the right should be no greater 
than is necessary to achieve the legitimate coun-
tervailing objective(s). But, while weighty, the right 
is not absolute and, in appropriate circumstances, 
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will yield to legitimate policy goals. This therefore 
creates space for judges to recognize and give effect 
to considerations of scarcity, given that equitable 
distribution of scarce resources is, at least ostensi-
bly, a policy goal that free and equal citizens of a 
liberal democratic society can reasonably accept. 
Kumm notes that this necessitates a “re-
characterization” of the nature of rights, and of 
adjudication upon them.23 The focus is not solely 
on the interpretation and application of legal prin-
ciples, but also (and primarily) on the assessment 
of justifications, with the right operating not as a 
demarcation of the boundaries of governmental 
actions and decisions (in effect operating as a “fire-
wall” to insulate legal claims from political activity 
which might negate or defeat them), but instead 
as a trigger for an inquiry into the justifiability of 
these boundaries. This approach thus connects to 
“the emergence of a transnational culture of justi-
fication” in which the authority of government to 
act rests not on the exercise of power, but rather 
upon the provision of cogent and persuasive ratio-
nales for its decisions and actions.24 More broadly 
still, it links to accounts of legitimacy in concep-
tions of deliberative democracy which emphasize 
the giving, weighing, acceptance, and rejection of 
reasons to encourage reflection upon, and possible 
transformation of, preferences in a non-coercive 
manner. This is notable, given that deliberative ap-
proaches have been viewed as especially germane to 
addressing problems of legitimacy arising from the 
need to make difficult choices on the allocation of 
scarce health care resources.25  
Various tools exist through which judges can 
give effect to an approach of this type. These include 
balancing, which is especially prominent in US 
constitutional jurisprudence, and reasonableness, 
which carries a variety of meanings permitting 
courts to adopt stances towards governmental 
decisions and actions ranging from extreme defer-
ence to intense scrutiny.26 However, the most widely 
used mechanism is proportionality, which entails 
a multi-stage analytical process. Once a putative 
infringement of a right has been established, the 
government (or other duty-bearer) must show (1) 
that the actions, decisions, or policy which impact-
ed upon the right were in pursuit of a legitimate 
aim; (2) that the actions, decisions, or policy were a 
suitable means of achieving the aim; (3) that there 
is no less intrusive but equally effective means of 
achieving the aim; and (4) that the actions, de-
cisions, or policy represent a net gain when the 
infringement of the right is measured against the 
level of realization of the aim (the balancing stage, or 
proportionality in the strict sense).27 In this manner, 
proportionality review can function to construct 
the content of socio-economic rights (including 
those to health) in such a way that these express “a 
proper balance between conflicting considerations 
and reflect appropriate means-end rationality.”28 It 
appears, therefore, to represent an obvious tool by 
means of which the excesses of judicialization in 
the health context can be restrained: indeed, it has 
been said to have “a disciplining and rationalizing 
effect on judicial decision-making.”29 Its use would 
therefore better enable this activity to approximate 
rationalist modes of allocative decision-making, 
such as HTA.  
As Gardbaum observes, the connection 
between proportionality, reasonableness, and 
balancing is close: proportionality amounts to a 
particular form of reasonableness (reasonableness 
as proportionality), and incorporates a particular 
form of balancing, that is “whether the value, bene-
fits, or gains of attaining the purpose are weightier 
than the value, costs, or injuries incurred in achiev-
ing it.”30 Each of the three tests can be fitted within 
a “particular conception of liberal democracy in 
which all government actions interfering with indi-
vidual rights and/or autonomy must be justified in 
terms of public reason,” in which 
the task of courts is to ensure not that the government 
has reached the one correct resolution of a contested 
rights issue but that the required justification 
for its actions falls within the parameters of the 
reasonable.31 
Hence, if, as suggested below, commitment to a 
particular conception of democracy is a prerequi-
site to adoption of a middle way between scarcity 
and the right to health, any one of these tests might 
be a suitable candidate for courts to adopt.
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However, the value of adopting propor-
tionality as a standard for review, apart from its 
familiarity to judges and decision-makers, would 
seem to lie in the fact that it functions by “setting a 
series of ground rules for the lawmaker,” which the 
lawmaker may satisfy 
by demonstrably showing that he carefully set the 
aim of measures that infringe on social rights; 
that he then considered the availability of other 
measures less impairing to the right; and that he 
went through this process elaborately and openly, so 
that his choice is reviewable by the courts,
although political choices continue to reside with 
legislature and government.32 It therefore imposes 
a greater degree of structure and transparency 
upon decision-making than do the looser tests of 
balancing or reasonableness, and thus, while func-
tioning as a substantive form of review (insofar as 
its application is triggered by alleged violation of 
a substantive right), it has significant procedural 
benefits, serving as a means of ensuring that the 
conditions of the “accountability for reasonable-
ness” model are realized.33 
Proportionality has secured status as “a domi-
nant technique of rights adjudication in the world.”34 
It is regarded as a central component of a “global 
model of constitutional rights.”35 Yet its meaning 
and applicability remain the subject of significant 
scholarly disputation.36 Within the context exam-
ined here, the primary matter of contention is its 
appropriateness as a standard for adjudication upon 
socio-economic rights. For example, Contiades and 
Fotiadou, Gardbaum, and Young all note judicial 
resistance to its use in cases of this type.37 A central 
difficulty resides in its utility in situations of scarci-
ty. This is well captured by Möller, who argues that 
the test is redundant in socio-economic cases 
because in almost all circumstances the realization 
of those rights requires scarce resources; therefore 
any limitation will always further the legitimate 
goal of saving resources and will always be suitable 
and necessary to the achievement of that goal.38 
However, this view has been challenged. Gardbaum 
argues that husbandry of scarce resources has not 
been specified in constitutional documents or in-
ternational rights instruments as a public policy 
objective which can legitimately be set against a right, 
and moreover that it is not always the case that lim-
itation of a right will necessarily save resources. For 
example, permitting access to certain public health 
interventions (such as the provision of nevirapine for 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV/
AIDS) may serve to reduce health expenditure in the 
longer term.39 Furthermore, Contiades and Fotiadou 
emphasize that the “defensive aspect” of proportion-
ality—protecting rights against limitations imposed 
by government, as outlined in Möller’s account—is 
not the basis of its applicability in cases involving 
socio-economic rights. Instead, it functions in more 
“creative” fashion, acknowledging the existence of 
competing legitimate interests and competition for 
resources, but ensuring that consideration of these 
by a decision-maker is undertaken “in a highly dis-
ciplined manner.”40 
Disagreements of this sort are far from 
uncommon in the literature on proportionality. 
They demonstrate that the concept remains deeply 
contested.41 This author would argue, therefore, 
that any agenda for future research on the right to 
health and the role of courts should incorporate 
close analysis of the applicability and utility of pro-
portionality. This will allow for a more far-reaching 
assessment of whether it can plausibly function as 
a standard which facilitates a middle way between 
rights and scarcity in the manner suggested here.42  
Towards a relational reading of health 
rights
Deployment of the proportionality test as the 
standard of review in instances where health-re-
lated rights are undergoing adjudication is not the 
only plausible step towards reorienting these in a 
manner which would avoid both supine judicial 
deference to political and managerial choices in 
health care on the one hand, and a conclusory—
perhaps peremptory—implementation of the right 
on the other. Rethinking the nature and meaning 
of the right to health itself represents a further ave-
nue which might be pursued. Interestingly, there is 
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judicial support for an endeavor of this type in the 
following, written extra-judicially by South African 
Constitutional Court judge Albie Sachs:  
The progressive realization of socio-economic rights 
within available resources...  indicates that a system 
of apportionment is fundamental to their very 
being. I am not sure as to the full implications of 
this distinction, both in terms of conceptualizing 
the nature of the right and in respect of determining 
appropriate remedies for a breach. Yet I am 
convinced that the exercise of a right that by its 
nature is shared, often competitively, with other 
holders of the right, must have different legal 
characteristics from the exercise of a classical 
individual civil right that is autonomous and 
complete in itself.43
Sachs had himself given a pointer to the possible 
form that such a reconceptualization might take 
in the case of Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 
(KwaZulu Natal), where he made the following 
observations:
In all the open and democratic societies based upon 
dignity, freedom and equality with which I am 
familiar, the rationing of access to life-prolonging 
resources is regarded as integral to, rather than 
incompatible with, a human rights approach to 
health care... Health care rights by their very nature 
have to be considered not only in a traditional 
legal context structured around the ideas of human 
autonomy but in a new analytical framework 
based on the notion of human interdependence. A 
healthy life depends upon social interdependence: 
the quality of air, water, and sanitation which the 
state maintains for the public good; the quality 
of one’s caring relationships, which are highly 
correlated to health; as well as the quality of health 
care and support furnished officially by medical 
institutions and provided informally by family, 
friends, and the community... Traditional rights 
analyses accordingly have to be adapted so as to 
take account of the special problems created by the 
need to provide a broad framework of constitutional 
principles governing the right of access to scarce 
resources and to adjudicate between competing 
rights bearers. When rights by their very nature are 
shared and interdependent, striking appropriate 
balances between the equally valid entitlements or 
expectations of a multitude of claimants should not 
be seen as imposing limits on those rights, but as 
defining the circumstances in which the rights may 
most fairly and effectively be enjoyed.44   
Here, Sachs rejects the traditional “defensive” ac-
count of proportionality centered upon the judicial 
mitigation of limitations imposed by government. 
More broadly, and perhaps unknowingly, the judge 
appears to be articulating an approach to rights 
that is grounded in notions of relational autonomy, 
which have proved especially influential in the 
health care field in the context of care ethics and, 
more broadly, feminist bioethics.45 This is: 
 
The label that has been given to an alternative 
conception of what it means to be a free, self-
governing agent who is also socially constituted and 
who possibly defines her basic value commitments 
in terms of interpersonal relations and mutual 
dependencies. Relational views of the autonomous 
person, then, valuably underscore the social 
embeddedness of selves while not forsaking the basic 
value commitments of (for the most part, liberal) 
justice.46 
At least superficially, this conception, grounded 
in a view of the human condition and political life 
as fundamentally interdependent, seems to meet 
Sachs’ call for a “new analytical framework” that 
can incorporate allocative decision-making along-
side, rather than in opposition to, health-related 
rights. As Tauber argues, 
rationing... assumes its moral force from a dual 
allegiance to notions of communal responsibilities 
of individuals (relational autonomy) and a 
social philosophy advocating equitable sharing 
of communal health care resources (distributive 
justice).47 
However, an important question is whether this ap-
proach is consonant with ideas of rights at all. For 
example, Tauber considers that a relational approach 
to autonomy “radically recasts widespread beliefs 
about individuality and rights. It shifts the burden 
of moral action on meeting obligations to others, as 
opposed to asserting self-defined liberties.”48 Oth-
ers working within the care ethics approach have 
been openly critical of rights for their (perceived) 
tendency to “insulate” existing structures of power 
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domination.49 A further concern for relational the-
orists (and others) is the oppositional character of 
rights, which are seen in conflictual terms requiring 
determination of the weightier, “winning” claim and 
thus emphasising the separation, rather than inter-
connectedness, of individuals from each other and 
from the collective.50 
Can rights, then, be incorporated into a re-
lational approach? One scholar who has taken on 
the challenge of addressing this question is Jennifer 
Nedelsky, who notes that “the practical issue is 
not whether but how the language of rights will be 
used” and who argues for a shift in understanding 
of the concept and how it is applied.51 
Nedelsky argues that 
what rights do and have always done is construct 
relationships – of power, of responsibility, of trust 
and obligation... in defining and enforcing rights, 
the law routinely structures and sometimes self-
consciously takes account of relationship; 
and she proposes that this structuring function 
should form the central focus of the idea of rights, 
their enforcement and interpretation.52 From this 
perspective, she challenges the individualistic 
orientation of rights inherent in liberal political 
thought, rooted in “the image of protective bound-
aries as essential to the integrity and autonomy of 
the self [which] is deep and pervasive in Western 
culture.”53 Rather, her goal is that 
the focus of analysis will shift from an abstraction of 
individual entitlement to an inquiry into the ways 
the right will shape relations and those relations, in 
turn, will promote (or undermine) the [collective 
societal] values at stake.54 
While Nedelsky accepts that this will not resolve 
all disagreements, given that the meaning both of 
rights and of the underlying community values 
they capture (such as equality, freedom, and ade-
quate material resources) is contested and evolves 
over time, her argument is that those disagreements 
are better couched within a debate “in terms of why 
people think some patterns of human relationships 
are better than others... and what sorts of legal 
rights will foster those relationships.”55 That debate 
might end up according priority to individual over 
collective claims, but it would at least do so on the 
basis of justification of those claims, rather than 
“tacit assumption.”56 This therefore returns us to the 
“culture of justification” and ideas of deliberative 
democracy which were sketched above and which 
will be explored further in the next section of this 
article. 
Feasibility is perhaps the greatest obstacle 
to adoption of a relational approach along the 
lines Nedelsky suggests. Although she claims that 
there is scope to use existing legal systems, insti-
tutions, processes, and norms to give effect to the 
framework she advocates, Nedelsky acknowledges 
that it would amount to a “transformation,” a “ge-
stalt-like change in how people see the world, in 
daily habits of thought as well as political theory 
and jurisprudence.”57 In particular, it represents a 
counter-hegemonic challenge to the “dominance of 
the liberal consensus” on human rights, which is 
rooted in deeply held individualistic, perhaps atom-
istic, visions of autonomy.58 Shifting the paradigm 
in such a way is clearly no straightforward matter. 
This is especially the case as the greater attention 
drawn by the relational reading to the contested 
nature of the societal values that underpin rights, 
and the different means by which these may best 
be given effect, tends to dilute the simplicity and 
absoluteness of a rights claim. Since it is these lat-
ter qualities that have made the right to health a 
valuable focus for campaigns for access, such as to 
treatment for HIV/AIDS, there would seem to be 
a lack of strong political incentive for claimants of 
health rights to endorse the relational approach.59 
Normative evolution and deliberative 
democracy 
It might be concluded from the above discussion 
that, while normative evolution of the right to 
health in a manner that can accommodate the scar-
city of resources is certainly possible, there remain 
awkward impediments to such development. At 
least for the present, the existence of these imped-
iments means that work of a theoretical character 
on the normative basis of the right to health is un-
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likely, on its own, to effect a transformation to the 
“all or nothing” quality of health rights litigation in 
practice. This is simply because, when confronted 
by such difficulties, it will be tempting for busy 
judges merely to reaffirm commitment to either of 
the activist or restrained positions identified above, 
rather than to seek to clear their own pathways 
through tricky normative territory in which, as 
practitioners rather than theoreticians, they are 
likely to be somewhat uncomfortable.  
However, if the type of normative clarifi-
cation and rethinking outlined here were to be 
accompanied by cultivation of a particular attitude 
to the role of courts within a democratic society, 
this would significantly enhance the prospects for 
development of a framework permitting proper 
judicial consideration of the interconnectedness 
of individual rights to health care and obligations 
to the community in circumstances of scarcity. 
The nature of that role has been alluded to above: a 
conceptualization of the courts as institutions con-
tributing to and functioning within a deliberative 
democracy, rather than bodies whose determina-
tion of questions of rights is definitive and binding. 
On this reading, the courtroom provides an 
arena in which argumentation, reasoning, and ex-
planation for policies and decisions can be publicly 
advanced and scrutinized. The rationales put for-
ward for judicial decisions seek to 
appeal to the political values [judges] think belong 
to the most reasonable understanding of the public 
conception and its political values of justice and 
public reason... that all citizens as reasonable and 
rational might reasonably be expected to endorse,
and such decisions play an “educative” role, 
enabling wider “political discussion to take a 
principled form so as to address the constitutional 
question in line with the political values of justice 
and public reason.”60 
Crucially, also, courts are viewed “as being not 
in a contestationary relationship with government 
but in a constitutional conversation with them,” with 
rights functioning not as absolutes or trumps but as 
standards of justification.61 Hence, the determina-
tion of the meaning and applicability of rights is not 
the sole province of the judiciary, since the legislative 
and executive branches also have an important part 
to play in deciding how to balance individual rights 
against competing rights and interests.62 
The normative developments explored in this 
article clearly accord with a deliberative reading of 
democracy. As discussed above, proportionality 
is a judicial tool centered upon the provision of 
justification “in terms of public reasons, reasons 
of the kind that every citizen might reasonably 
accept, even if actually they don’t.”63 Similarly, the 
relational approach proposed by Nedelsky con-
nects closely to a deliberative conception. She notes 
that relationality requires “ways of continually 
asking whether our institutions of democratic de-
cision-making are generating outcomes consistent 
with [basic] values.”64 This connotes a “dialogue of 
democratic accountability” which is not premised 
upon the notion that certain values (rights) are 
trumps, but wherein those rights and the limits 
upon them are “open ended and shifting, requiring 
judgment and debate.”65 For Nedelsky, therefore, 
accountability has a “back-and-forth” quality in 
which not only the institutions of government 
participate, but which also engenders wider public 
debate upon the societal values at stake, the kinds 
of relationships that would foster those values, and 
whether differing versions of rights would structure 
relations differently.66 
Yet, while, as suggested above, there is poten-
tial for courts to act as mechanisms through which 
effect can be given to institutional—and by exten-
sion, public—deliberation of the type Nedelsky 
envisages, it might be objected that their engage-
ment in such an undertaking is problematic, in 
that it is insufficiently democratic, since judges are 
usually unelected. Moreover, the act of adjudica-
tion (especially, perhaps, the act of interpreting the 
meaning of constitutional provisions) necessitates 
specialist legal training and expertise, which can 
render it relatively inaccessible to the wider public. 
These general concerns may be exacerbated by the 
particular socio-political environments in which 
courts function. For example, in an analysis of 
Latin America, Hammergren points to a tendency 
towards insulation from external debate, a lack of 
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transparency and accountability, and a failure to 
appreciate the broader societal impacts of judg-
ments, none of which are properly consonant with 
a deliberative approach.67 
It is notable, however, that other scholars have 
expressed much greater confidence in the delib-
erative capacity of courts, both in Latin America 
and elsewhere. 68 Here again, therefore, there exists 
much scope for further theoretical analysis and 
empirical investigation.  
Conclusion
Gargarella has observed that, while articulation of 
a justifiable role for courts in health rights cases 
that “defies the ambiguous and unattractive no-
tions of judicial restraint and judicial activism” is 
certainly possible, it nonetheless represents a “chal-
lenge” to conventional views on judicial review, the 
separation of powers and democracy.69 The analysis 
presented in this article serves strongly to reinforce 
this assessment. Development and clarification 
of the normative basis of the right to health in a 
manner which would enable courts to respond sen-
sitively and appropriately to conditions of scarcity 
is manifestly a highly demanding task. However, 
grasping this nettle will continue to be necessary, 
given that further health rights litigation—both 
in Latin America and across the globe—is inevita-
ble and that problems of allocation within health 
systems will continue to manifest themselves as a 
consequence. The modest intention of the present 
author has been to trace certain pathways through 
which this challenge might be addressed. It is hoped 
that this will provoke others to further engage with 
and evolve this important work. 
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